Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is on something of a diplomatic roll at the moment. Having concluded a weeklong visit to the United States on July 19, 2026, during which he charmed President Donald Trump, al-Zaidi is now expected to head to Tehran to do the same with Iran’s new leaders. Trips to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria all figure on his itinerary, too.

The U.S. visit was the first – and arguably most important – stop on a broader effort to give domestic legitimacy to al-Zaidi’s government and attract foreign investment while elevating Iraq’s status in the Middle East.

Alongside seeking closer ties with Washington, Baghdad hopes to maintain its longstanding relationship with Tehran amid a renewed U.S.-Iran confrontation and the economic shock caused by disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. Becoming a bridge between the two countries – and a possible host to Iran-U.S. negotiations – will help establish Iraq in the delicate position.

But it is also telling that the U.S. visit – which included a high-level business summit and meetings with American energy executives in Houston – was carefully orchestrated with an eye towards a new U.S. regional strategy focused on trade and investment in the Middle East, with Iraq as a key component. As a close observer on Middle East geopolitics, I believe it all points toward Iraq’s emergence as a strategic connector in a Middle East increasingly shaped by energy, infrastructure trade and investment networks.

Iraq’s value to competing countries

Iraq’s growing importance as a potential nexus for diplomacy and commerce reflects both domestic changes and broader regional shifts. The massive degrading of the Islamic State group in Iraq and across the region, improvements in security and Baghdad’s more active diplomacy have expanded Iraq’s room for maneuver.

At the same time, the fall of the Tehran-aligned Assad regime in Syria, the weakening of Iran’s proxies in the region and the U.S.-Iran war have heightened the strategic value of Iraq’s geography, institutions and relationships. In short, as the regional balance has been reshaped and Iran’s traditional network of influence disrupted, Iraq has become an increasingly important platform for military coordination, regional diplomacy and economic connectivity.

Amid those changes, al-Zaidi’s U.S. visit underscores that Washington is reassessing Iraq’s role at a time when nearly every major regional actor is doing the same. Iran, the Arab Gulf states and China have each deepened their engagement with Baghdad, pursuing different objectives yet recognizing that Iraq occupies a position of unusual strategic importance.

For Washington, the reassessment reflects a shift away from the post-Iraq War view of Baghdad primarily through the lens of counterterrorism and military stabilization. Instead, U.S. officials and Iraqi counterparts increasingly see a broader partnership. New economic deals signal an effort to strengthen Iraq’s energy sector, modernize infrastructure and expand private-sector investment.

Security cooperation remains important, but it now complements a broader strategy aimed at building a more resilient Iraqi state capable of managing competing external pressures and governance in general.

Beyond the US role

For Tehran, Iraq is central to its regional strategy at a moment when Iran faces a more challenging environment elsewhere. Iraq provides a strategic buffer, extensive commercial ties and a critical corridor connecting Iran to partners across the Levant. As Tehran’s broader regional allies such as Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis come under pressure, preserving its position in Iraq has become even more important.

The Arab Gulf states have similarly recalibrated their approach. While security concerns – particularly Iraq’s relationship with Iran – continue to shape their policies, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf kingdoms view Baghdad’s post-Islamic State group trajectory as an opportunity for engagement through investment, infrastructure and economic integration.

A more stable and connected Iraq can link Gulf markets, capital and infrastructure initiatives with global trade and investment while reducing the risks associated with instability emanating from Iran.

China’s role illustrates another dimension of Iraq’s importance. As Baghdad becomes an increasingly important arena for geopolitical and commercial competition, Chinese companies will need to compete more aggressively for contracts, and Beijing will face greater incentives to deepen its engagement in Iraq to preserve its influence.

Yet China’s interests are not limited to securing access or outcompeting rivals; a stable, economically viable Iraq is itself valuable to Beijing as a reliable energy partner and a potential hub for broader regional connectivity. In this respect, quite apart from great-power competition, U.S. and Chinese interests are broadly compatible.

These various developing relationships with Iraq do not represent a simple competition among rival countries or blocs. Instead, they coexist, reflecting Baghdad’s effort to diversify external relationships while avoiding excessive dependence on any single power.

An emerging strategic connector

What distinguishes Iraq is not simply its geography but the unusual overlap of relationships that few other Middle Eastern states possess. Baghdad can engage Washington on security and energy, Tehran on political and commercial ties, Beijing on infrastructure and trade and the Gulf states on investment and regional connectivity.

This gives Iraq the characteristics of what I am calling an “intermediary state” – a country whose influence derives from its ability to remain connected to competing political, economic and security networks while helping shape how those networks interact.

Iraq therefore offers a glimpse of a broader transformation in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Military power and traditional alliances remain central but influence increasingly flows through the systems that connect economies and societies: energy infrastructure, electricity networks, logistics corridors, financial systems and investment relationships.

States that shape these networks will have greater ability to influence the region’s future.

The vulnerability in Iraq’s approach

The challenge is whether Iraq can convert this connectivity into national advantage without allowing external competition to overwhelm government decision-making.

The same relationships that increase Baghdad’s value also create incentives for outside actors to compete within its political system. Connectivity can provide leverage, but without stronger institutions it can also deepen dependence.

The most immediate challenge is consolidating state authority. Al-Zaidi’s effort to bring non-state armed groups under government control will test whether powerful Iran-aligned militias in Iraq will relinquish the autonomy, political influence and economic interests they have accumulated over two decades. Progress toward disarmament is likely to prove uneven, particularly if regional tensions again increase the perceived value of these groups to Tehran.

Iraq’s domestic political economy presents an equally formidable obstacle. Patronage networks, corruption and fragmented governance continue to limit Baghdad’s ability to implement nationwide reforms, attract sustained investment and translate external partnerships into broad-based economic development. Converting strategic importance into lasting national strength ultimately depends as much on institutional capacity as foreign relationships.

External dynamics will also remain consequential. Persistent distrust between Washington and Tehran ensures that Iraq will continue to face pressure from competing powers seeking to shape its political trajectory. Distrust alone would be the least of Iraq’s concerns. Were the current escalation in U.S.-Iran hostilities to spiral into a protracted, wider regional war, both Iraq’s prospects of realizing this potential and the al-Zaidi government’s survival would be at risk.

Whatever transpires on that front, China is unlikely to retreat from a market where it has become a leading trading partner and major infrastructure investor. The Arab Gulf states will continue seeking a more stable and economically integrated Iraq. And Washington will still want a partner capable of resisting destabilizing pressures, not to mention helping to counterbalance China.

The challenge for Baghdad will be managing these overlapping relationships while ensuring that foreign partnerships strengthen rather than constrain Iraqi sovereignty.

John Calabrese ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

Les proliférations de la microalgue Ostreopsis, fréquentes depuis une vingtaine d’années sur le pourtour méditerranéen, ont émergé sur les côtes du Pays basque depuis 2021. Les eaux prennent alors une teinte brunâtre, tandis que les cas d’irritations respiratoires à proximité se multiplient. Que sait-on de la toxicité de cette algue ? Un projet de recherche est en cours pour répondre aux questions qui restent encore en suspens.

Par temps calme, les eaux du littoral basque sont peu turbides et pour ainsi dire, transparentes. Mais depuis plus de cinq ans, chaque été, cette eau transparente peut prendre une couleur brune sur des périodes de quelques jours, sans qu’il y ait eu de tempête pour troubler l’eau.

Cette coloration des eaux côtières est très localisée, prenant la forme de « nappes » qui se déplacent au gré des courants et qui se distinguent très nettement à l’œil nu. Simultanément, des irritations respiratoires sont expérimentées par certains usagers du littoral, ayant pour conséquence la fermeture de plages par les autorités locales. Au moment de l’écriture de cet article, début juillet 2026, plusieurs plages au Pays basque ont de nouveau été fermées de façon préventive.

Ces deux phénomènes sont-ils liés et comment ? Des recherches, auxquelles nous participons, sont en cours pour mieux comprendre ce qui se joue entre coloration de l’eau et irritations respiratoires. État des lieux.

Des microalgues qui en font voir de toutes les couleurs

Un litre d’eau de mer contient de très nombreuses espèces microbiennes invisibles à l’œil nu. On peut y retrouver des milliards de virus, des millions de bactéries et des milliers de microalgues.

Les microalgues sont des organismes unicellulaires microscopiques végétaux capables de réaliser la photosynthèse. Quand les conditions environnementales optimales à leur croissance sont atteintes, les microalgues peuvent former des « efflorescences » (ou blooms) qui se traduisent par une importante concentration en cellules dans l’eau par rapport à la moyenne.

Or, pour effectuer la photosynthèse, les microalgues possèdent de nombreux pigments, notamment de la chlorophylle et des caroténoïdes, qui leur donnent, en fonction de la microalgue, une couleur verte, rouge, orangée, brune, voire rose.

Quand la concentration en cellules d’une espèce de microalgues dans l’eau dépasse plusieurs centaines de milliers de cellules par litres, l’eau prend donc la couleur de ses principaux pigments, et ces organismes microscopiques, d’ordinaire invisibles, se révèlent à nos yeux.

Les eaux brunes observées au Pays basque résultent ainsi de la production majoritaire de peridinine par l’espèce de microalgue qui prolifère.

Un rôle essentiel pour les équilibres marins et planétaires… mais des effets sanitaires délétères

Ces efflorescences microalgales sont communes en milieu marin. Elles peuvent parfois couvrir des centaines de kilomètres carrés, et sont même visibles depuis l’espace, comme le montre l’image ci-dessous.

Ces efflorescences sont essentielles au fonctionnement de la pompe biologique océanique et à notre climat planétaire, car elles fixent le dioxyde de carbone atmosphérique via la photosynthèse et le stockent sous forme de carbone organique. Elles soutiennent également toute la chaîne alimentaire marine et sont donc indispensables au développement de la vie sous-marine.

Mais le développement de certaines espèces en milieu côtier est associé à des effets délétères sur la santé humaine. C’est le cas notamment des microalgues du groupe des dinoflagellés, qui possèdent une toxicité importante sur le fonctionnement cellulaire chez les mammifères. La toxicité des dinoflagellés est le plus souvent liée à la consommation de produits de la mer, du fait de leur bioaccumulation dans la chair animale.

Mais plus récemment, l’émergence de nouvelles formes de toxicité associées à ce groupe de microalgues est observée. Des dermatites au Sénégal et dans les Caraïbes, ainsi que des irritations respiratoires dans de nombreuses régions du monde, dont le Pays basque, sont documentées.

Pourquoi Ostreopsis s’est-elle installée au Pays basque ?

Depuis 2019, deux microalgues du genre Ostreopsis ont nouvellement colonisé le littoral basque : Ostreopsis sp.9 (encore non nommée), puis Ostreopsis cf. ovata. Ces deux espèces ont la particularité d’être principalement benthiques, c’est-à-dire qu’elles se développent au fond de l’eau. Néanmoins, au cours de la journée, une partie de ces cellules fixées se détache du fond, atteignant la surface de l’eau pour former des amas de cellules incorporées au mucus qu’elles produisent.

Ostreopsis étant une microalgue brune, les fortes concentrations cellulaires atteintes en été (jusqu’à 600 000 cellules par litre, selon les mesures réalisées dans la Communauté d’agglomération du Pays basque) donnent une coloration brune à l’eau de mer de manière localisée, aux endroits où les amas se forment. Ces amas peuvent s’accumuler le long du littoral, formant de larges nappes brunes qui dérivent vers le large au gré des courants.

Grâce aux nombreuses études déjà menées en Méditerranée, où les espèces du genre Ostreopsis prolifèrent depuis 20 ans, les conditions de croissance optimales pour leur développement sont assez bien connues.

• une température supérieure à 21 °C,

• des eaux calmes et peu profondes,

• ou encore la présence d’un substrat rocheux ou macroalgal (c’est-à-dire, des algues plus grandes) qui leur permet de se développer.

Ainsi, la topographie rocheuse du plancher sous-marin d’une grande majorité des plages basques, qui forment à marée basse des zones calmes peu profondes, joue un rôle clé. Ces zones rocheuses à fort couvert macroalgal constituent des zones propices au développement d’Ostreopsis. Ce territoire connaît ainsi deux à trois efflorescences par été depuis cinq ans.

Plusieurs hypothèses, pour l’heure non vérifiées, pourraient expliquer l’installation d’Ostreopsis au Pays basque, la plus plausible étant un transport de cellules par les courants depuis des régions plus au Sud, voire de Méditerranée.

La durée moyenne d’une efflorescence est de 20 jours, avec une phase exponentielle de croissance d’une à deux semaines pendant laquelle les cellules prolifèrent, suivie d’une phase stationnaire qui dure en général quelques jours et pendant laquelle de fortes concentrations en cellules se maintiennent dans le milieu. Elle est enfin suivie d’une phase de déclin, qui se caractérise par la sénescence des cellules (mort cellulaire, prédation, attaques virales ou parasitaire), pouvant être accélérée par des phénomènes de vent, de vagues et de courant.

Comprendre l’impact sanitaire d’Ostreopsis

À l’été 2025, de nombreuses plages du Pays basque ont successivement fait l’objet d’efflorescences d’Ostreopsis. La plage d’Erromardie a été la première à accueillir une efflorescence dès le début du mois de juillet, mais c’est à la plage du Port vieux à Biarritz que les plus fortes concentrations ont été enregistrées (600 000 cellules par litre au 15 juillet 2025). À l’heure où cet article est rédigé (juillet 2026), le Pays basque voit les premières fermetures de plages de la saison.

Au même moment, des cas d’irritations de la sphère ORL ont été enregistrés au sein de la population côtière. Bien que la relation exacte entre cellules microalgales dans l’eau et occurrence des symptômes soit encore mal connue, de fortes concentrations cellulaires sont concomitantes avec l’apparition de toux, rhinite, de symptômes grippaux, ou encore gastriques chez les personnes exposées aux embruns marins.

Ainsi, en 2023, l’Anses recommandait une fermeture de plage au-delà d’un seuil de 100 000 cellules par litre d’eau de mer, nécessitant un suivi régulier des concentrations par les autorités locales.

Les mécanismes envisagés pour faire le lien entre proliférations d’algues et toxicité des embruns

Le lien entre les proliférations d’Ostreopsis et la toxicité des embruns marins n’est pas encore compris, et constitue l’un des objectifs du projet INTERREG Ostreobila.

Plusieurs hypothèses sont en cours d’étude pour rattacher les symptômes observés aux épisodes d’efflorescence d’Ostreopsis, impliquant toutes un transfert mer-air de molécules produites par ces efflorescences :

• des phycotoxines (les ovatoxines) expulsées par Ostreopsis via les embruns,

• des protéines inflammatoires constitutives de la cellule de la microalgue expulsées, là encore via les embruns,

• des gaz non identifiés émis à des concentrations importantes et qui se volatilisent depuis l’eau de mer.

À ce stade des recherches, il n’est pas exclu qu’une combinaison de tous ces composés, ou que d’autres produits issus de réactions atmosphériques secondaires complexes non anticipées, soient à l’origine des irritations de la sphère ORL. La microalgue Ostreopsis n’a pas encore fini de révéler ses secrets et de nouveaux projets de recherche ont fait l’objet de financements afin de déterminer les mécanismes à l’origine des effets de ces microalgues sur la santé humaine.

Eva Ternon a reçu des financements de l'Union Européenne, via le projet INTERREG POCTEFA Ostreobila

Rodolphe Lemée a reçu des financements de l'Union Européenne, via le projet INTERREG POCTEFA Ostreobila

IN BRIEFClick here for the key takeaways In France notably, during the 1990s, association-led action in the context of the HIV pandemic resulted in the development of “health democracy”. Six years following the onset of COVID, anthropological research focusing on an association for victims’ families in Bergamo, Italy—where the pandemic began in Europe—show that legal action can have a significant impact. The redefinition of the crime of “culpable epidemic” by Italy’s Highest Court could inspire legislative changes elsewhere in Europe and worldwide. Close

The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends involving populations in the response to epidemics, and even co-constructing responses with them. This approach is in line with “ health democracy” that is enshrined in French law and developed by a movement combining ethics, human rights, and public health. As a reminder, health democracy is an approach that aims to involve service users, professionals, and public decision-makers in the development and implementation of health policies in a spirit of dialogue and consultation.

However, the importance attached to this concept varies from country to country, and its practical application is debated whenever a new outbreak occurs. This is currently the case with the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In the context of COVID, using the law to enforce health democracy

In Italy, the association network was mobilised during the COVID pandemic for rescue and care interventions, but was not involved in public health decisions. In Bergamo, Sereni e sempre uniti (“Serene and Always United”) is an association that was founded by families of victims during the pandemic with the goal of mutual support and advocacy.

From the perspective of the socio-anthropology of associations, this organization has adopted a unique positioning that holds major scientific interest. It differs from other associations representing healthcare professionals, families, or people living with HIV, in that it uses the law as a tool to enforce health democracy.

Our research began in 2020. Initially centred on experiences with COVID and the social relationships between patients, families, and healthcare professionals and around Bergamo and in the Seriana Valley, it gradually shifted focus to the association’s rationales of action in response to the failure of public health systems in a province where 6,000 deaths were mourned.

Ethnographic investigations (participant observation and traditional methods) have continued to the present day to ensure full documentation of the process.

A case of flawed crisis management by the Italian authorities

The first European country to be hit by an outbreak of the pandemic, Italy recorded its earliest cases in the highly industrialised Seriana Valley. While the Lombardy region boasts a renowned healthcare system, it is characterised by a progressive desertification of public health infrastructure, attributed to aggressive privatisation policies. This structural vulnerability, combined with political decisions made during the crisis, led within a few weeks of the first COVID wave to internationally broadcasted images of a convoy of military trucks evacuating coffins that could no longer be managed locally.

A fierce controversy erupted over measures described as “makeshift” and systemic negligence in implementing protocols. Families denounced the circumstances surrounding the deaths of their loved ones: saturated facilities, overcrowded emergency departments with endless waiting lines, resource shortages preventing access to care, and corpses piled up in churches. Many people died at home from asphyxiation because medical oxygen was unavailable.

An association’s legal battle

Families then banded together to create the Noi Denunceremo movement (“We will Denounce”), which quickly evolved into the association Sereni e sempre uniti. The association develops support initiatives for its members and promotes the memory of those who died from COVID-19, efforts which have expanded into lobbying activities such as protests and public statements. Furthermore, with the support of a group of lawyers led by attorney Consuelo Locati, the association pursued legal action to obtain explanations regarding the relevance and legitimacy of the measures adopted during the pandemic. A total of 700 complaints became the subject of two judicial proceedings against the Italian Ministry of Health, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and the administrators of the Lombardy region. In April 2020, the Bergamo Public Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation that would last three years and culminate in the indictment of the officials and politicians who managed the pandemic.

These findings represent a significant milestone for Sereni’s legal action, as highlighted by Professor Andrea Crisanti in his 2022 report for the Bergamo Prosecutor’s Office (Crisanti A. 2022. Technical expert report by Professor Andrea Crisanti ordered by the Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Bergamo. Report No. 15749/2020/21 No. 3).

This legal battle, which aims to establish truth, justice, and recognition, attempts to end the impunity of health officials and, through this, to restore the dignity that victims have been denied until now. It also aims to ensure that, in the future, populations are less helpless against the authorities’ errors and, above all, more involved in the development and implementation of epidemic preparedness and response measures a demand fully aligned with health democracy.

For six years, along with its lawyers the Sereni association carried out preliminary documentation work based on collecting, organising, and then filing thousands of pages of documents with the courts - an essential step in the judicial decisions that have marked this campaign.

A landscape-changing victory

A decisive step in the legal battle was reached on April 10, 2025, when the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation broadened the legal definition of the crime of “culpable epidemic” to include “omission, negligence, inaction, and silence in the context of a duty to inform.”

This ruling could lead to the reopening of criminal proceedings previously dismissed against high-ranking officials from political and health institutions at the time of the events. It could also inspire legislative changes in other countries. This event offers even greater hope as it builds on two other previous successes. In 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) agreed to hear the case Sereni submitted, which revealed human rights violations in the management of the pandemic – a rare feat, as only 5% of complaints submitted to this court are accepted. The association is currently awaiting further developments. Then, on March 24, 2026, the families within the association were officially recognised as victims by the Rome Criminal Court. During this preliminary hearing involving Ministry of Health officials, it was formally established that Italy’s national pandemic plan, which should have been updated, “was not updated, in part due to a lack of resources.” . This opened a breach in the wall of omerta and immunity that had protected the authorities for six years regarding the failures in crisis management.

These three events show that the association has achieved significant successes due to four main elements: the expertise of dedicated lawyers who were themselves personally affected by the loss of loved ones; the considerable effort put into documenting and preparing legal cases; the perseverance that allowed them to overcome institutional timelines; and the support of hundreds of families. One ethnographic vignette illustrates this vividly.

On March 24, 2026, inside the vast courtroom of Rome’s Criminal Court, filled with law enforcement officers, around one hundred members of Sereni had travelled more than 600 kilometres to stand alongside their lawyers during the hearing. A wall of solidarity and support, a deeply emotional presence, ensuring that the voice of the citizens is heard and carries weight when it comes to the health of all.

In Italy and beyond, Sereni’s perseverance bolsters associations’ power to challenge authorities

Within a hostile national context in which neither politics nor the health officials responsible for managing the crisis were able to shed light on the reasons for the disaster, this association found in the justice system a means to push forward its grievances, and those of the victims’ families.

The stakes do not only concern the affected families. For populations, in Italy and beyond, Sereni’s exemplary associative perseverance further solidifies the power of associations against authorities and paves the way to a form of health democracy. Monitoring the proceedings initiated six years ago will require several more months or years of anthropological documentation.

Today, the ethnographic inquiry among the families of the deceased and members of the association shows that its activist work has helped restore meaning to the hardships they endured, enabling them to overcome situations of grief described as traumatic, impossible, or absent, for deaths experienced as unjust.

More steps to take and a final chapter to write

Citizen mobilisation has also helped legally redefine the notion of “culpable epidemic, » significantly expanding its scope. As a result, "omission, negligence, inaction, and silence in the context of an obligation to inform” have become subject to imprisonment in Italy.

In light of the positions held by global health institutions, the scope of this legal reclassification deserves to be further expanded to include epidemic preparedness, or even community participation in the development of strategies.

Will this legal concept have an incentive effect? A call went out for further research to determine whether this specific Italian legal singularity — the “crime of culpable epidemic through omission, negligence, or inaction” — now empowers populations to exert tangible power over the government in defining and implementing health policies.

The recognition of this legal concept in other countries could help hold States accountable for the preparedness of their healthcare systems, an essential element for gaining public trust and ensuring an effective response to epidemics.

The COMESCOV project, titled “Containment and Health Measures to limit COVID-19 transmission: Social Experiences in France, Italy, and the USA in the time of a pandemic” (ANR-20COVI-0083-01), is supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR), which funds project-based research in France. The ANR’s mission is to support and promote the development of basic and applied research across all disciplines, and to strengthen the dialogue between science and society. For more information, visit the ANR website..

Chiara Alfieri is a member of the Associazione famigliari delle vittime del covid-19 Sereni e sempre uniti. She received funding from France's National Research Agency to back the COMESCOV project ("Confinement and sanitary precautions aimed at limiting the spread of Covid-19: Social experiments during the pandemic in France, Italy and the USA", ANR-20-COVI-0083-01).

Marc Egrot received financing from France's National Research Agency to back the COMESCOV project ("Confinement and sanitary precautions aimed at limiting the spread of Covid-19: Social experiments during the pandemic in France, Italy and the USA", ANR-20-COVI-0083-01).

Alice Desclaux ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.