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This article is the result of a collaboration with The Sunday Times. You can find their corresponding piece here. A key leader of the Kinahan cartel who is wanted by authorities around the world and has been living in hiding in Dubai for a decade has just had his Emirates residence permit renewed. A Bellingcat […]
This article is the result of a collaboration with The Sunday Times. You can find their corresponding piece here.
The Kinahan cartel, led by Christy Kinahan (centre) and his sons Christopher Jr (left) and Daniel (right), controls one of the most powerful transnational crime groups in the world from the Emirates. Source: Supplied
A key leader of the Kinahan cartel who is wanted by authorities around the world and has been living in hiding in Dubai for a decade has just had his Emirates residence permit renewed.
A Bellingcat and The Sunday Times review of public immigration records from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has revealed that Christopher Kinahan Jr, the son of cartel founder Christy Kinahan, was issued with a new visa less than two weeks ago.
This is despite his status as a sanctioned individual who is the subject of a $5 million reward from the US government for information leading to his arrest.
Our analysis has also exposed the residence statuses of the crime gang’s other sanctioned leaders who remain at large in Dubai. The records include previously unknown companies where the cartel members are purportedly employed.
The US government has offered a $5 million reward for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Christopher Kinahan Jr for participating in transnational organised crime, namely narcotics trafficking and money laundering.
It comes after Christopher Jr’s older brother Daniel Kinahan lost his final appeal in Dubai last week to prevent being extradited back to Ireland. He is the second key figure of the crime group to be apprehended in the Emirates following his high-profile arrest in April.
The Kinahan Organised Crime Group is a $1.5 billion transnational network involved in drug trafficking, money laundering and arms smuggling. Investigators have connected it to Iran’s intelligence services and the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah.
The cartel’s senior leadership – Christy Kinahan, 69, and his sons Daniel, 49, and Christopher Jr, 45, their cousin Ian Dixon, 36, along with associates Sean McGovern, 40, Bernard Clancy, 48, and Johnny Morrissey, 66 – was sanctioned by the US government in 2022.
Christopher Kinahan Jr and his father Christy Kinahan, seen in the background of a photo posted to a Dubai restaurant’s social media in 2023.
The UAE reportedly banned the Kinahans from doing business in the wake of the sanctions and the Emiratis also claim to have frozen €200 million in Kinahan assets. However, our findings suggest the cartel is still doing business in the Emirates and its leadership has repeatedly engaged with immigration authorities in the years following the sanctions.
The visa records were accessed through publicly available UAE government websites. We entered data contained in the US government’s sanctions notice, including the gang members’ ID or passport number, birth date and nationality, to view their immigration files.
Action
in Dubai
Six of the seven key cartel figures who were sanctioned by
the US in 2022 lived in Dubai. Cartel lieutenant Sean McGovern was extradited
to Ireland in 2025 and jailed in June.
Daniel Kinahan awaits
extradition from Dubai.
Online
Immigration Records
Our open source review of immigration records shows two members
have active residence
permits. The other two have expired permits.
Chris Kinahan Jr
Active
Permit
Christopher Kinahan Jr’s residence permit was renewed on July 20
for a two-year period. His previous visa had expired in December
2024. The new residence card lists his employment as “sales
officer” at a company named Island Star Tourism.
Bernard Clancy
Active
Permit
Bernard Clancy’s most recent two-year residence permit was
renewed in January. Like Christopher Jr, Clancy’s stated
profession is “sales officer”, but for a company named Al Matn
Goods Wholesalers LLC.
Christy Kinahan
Expired
Permit
Ian
Dixon
Expired
Permit
Records for Christy Kinahan and Ian Dixon show the residence
permits associated with their available passport numbers have
expired.
Christy Kinahan
Expired
Permit
On his most recent visa, which expired on April 1, Christy
Kinahan’s listed employer is OSA Management Consultancies DWC
LLC. This firm is based at the same Dubai
address as CV Aviation Consulting Services DWC LLC,
another company reportedly
linked to the cartel.
Ian Dixon
Expired
Permit
Dixon’s employer listed on his most recent visa was Hoopoe
Sports LLC, one of the firms sanctioned by the US for being
“owned or controlled” by Dixon.
Christy
Kinahan
The UAE imposes a
fine for each day a person stays in the country after
their visa expires. A Dubai government portal shows Christy
Kinahan owes the equivalent of more than USD $1,000 for an 81
day overstay.
Ian Dixon
Dixon, whose residency expired in 2024, owes more than USD
$11,000 for an 852-day overstay.
Sanctioned
Christy
Kinahan
Dubai
Expired Permit
81 days overstay
Fine: ~$1,000
Chris
Kinahan Jr
Dubai
Active Permit
Renewed: Jul 2026
Island Star Tourism
Bernard
Clancy
Dubai
Active Permit
Renewed: Jan 2026
Al Matn Goods Wholesalers LLC
Ian Dixon
Dubai
Expired Permit
852 days overstay
Fine: ~$11,000
Daniel
Kinahan
Dubai
Sean
McGovern
Dubai > IRE
Johnny
Morrissey
Spain
Chris Kinahan Jr
Dubai
Active Permit
Residence permit for Christopher Kinahan Jr. Source: GDRFA Dubai
Bernard Clancy
Dubai
Active Permit
Residence permit for Bernard Patrick Clancy under the name
“Bernard Patrick”. Source: GDRFA Dubai
Christy Kinahan
Dubai
Expired Permit
Ian Dixon
Dubai
Expired Permit
Expired residence permits for Christy Kinahan and Ian Dixon.
Source: GDRFA Dubai
Christy Kinahan
Dubai
Expired Permit
Expired residence permit for Christy Kinahan. Source: GDRFA
Dubai
Ian Dixon
Dubai
Expired Permit
Expired residence permit for Ian Dixon. Source: GDRFA Dubai
Screenshots of fine records for Christy Kinahan and Ian Dixon.
Source: GDRFA Dubai
Screenshots of fine records for Christy Kinahan and Ian Dixon.
Source: GDRFA Dubai
*Bellingcat searched the Dubai government’s identity and foreign affairs portal by inputting data about the
cartel’s leadership that was contained in the US government’s sanctions notice. Searching the gang
members’ ID or passport number, birth date and nationality returned a
“Unified Number”, a unique identifier assigned to every UAE visa holder.
This number, when entered with the other identity information on a UAE federal government portal, returned
the visa holder’s current status, history and file number.
Roy McComb, a former deputy director of the UK’s National Crime Agency, told The Sunday Times it was preposterous to suggest that the UAE did not know the visa status of the cartel members in Dubai.
“How is Christy Kinahan in the UAE unlawfully and the authorities there are unwilling to take appropriate action? The Kinahans are not an unknown entity, they are at the very apex of organised crime,” he said. “For the UAE not to know their residency status beggars belief.”
David Haigh, a British solicitor who was imprisoned on fraud charges in Dubai and now assists victims of abuse in the region, said it was clear the cartel must be paying off officials. “If someone is living openly there for a long period of time with that level of heat, that to me shows there’s been corruption involved,” he said. “If they were using false passports to enter Dubai, that’s a serious federal offence.”
Daniel and Christy Kinahan – nicknamed “The Dapper Don” – at a Dubai sports arena last June. Source: WeCaptureYou, TrillerTV
The passport details publicly listed in the US sanctions provide an unprecedented glimpse into the timeline of the cartel leadership’s visa history, giving an overview of their initial entry and exit to the Emirates.
The records show that four of the six key gang members had entered the UAE long before the 2016 attempt on Daniel Kinahan’s life in Dublin and the ensuing deadly feud that led to the cartel’s full relocation to the UAE.
A passport number for Christopher Kinahan Jr is linked to short-term UAE visas issued as early as September 2013. A passport number listed for Daniel Kinahan, searched in combination with an alternative sanctions-listed date of birth that is not his real one, returned seven short-term UAE visas between 2013 and 2015. It is not known what name this passport was under, but Daniel Kinahan has reportedly held illegitimate passports in the past.
A short-term visa for details associated with Ian Dixon first appeared in 2015. Authorities allege that Dixon acted as a trusted lieutenant to Daniel Kinahan by helping move bulk cash across Europe, arranging payments and keeping tabs on money owed by a narco-trafficker. In June, we revealed that Dixon was the poster boy for a padel club in Dubai, where he has been captured playing the racquet sport on webcams.
Left: Ian Dixon has been sanctioned by the US Treasury as part of its action against the Kinahan cartel. Right: Dixon at a racquet sports event post-sanctions. Source: US Treasury, sanddune_padel_dxb / Instagram
The earliest visas found for details associated with Sean McGovern and Bernard Clancy were from March and April 2016 respectively, the months after the 2016 attack in Dublin.
All key members of the group, with the exception of crime boss Christy Kinahan, gained residency in the UAE using Irish passports. The cartel founder’s British passport number is linked to his immigration file; both to his latest residence permit and four previous temporary visas. Records show the first visa associated with this passport was issued in February 2007 – the earliest known instance of Christy Kinahan entering the UAE. Another was issued in November 2009, and then two more in 2017.
However, details for an Irish passport under one of Christy Kinahan’s aliases (“Christopher O’Brien”) return 31 separate records on the UAE’s visa inquiry portal between 2014 and 2017. Bellingcat confirmed this passport number was associated with the name Christopher O’Brien after discovering both in corporate documents for a now-defunct Hong Kong firm that was incorporated in February 2014. This suggests Kinahan may have been using a false passport to travel to and from the UAE in addition to traveling under his authentic document. A man was jailed in 2003 after admitting he supplied “fraudulently obtained genuine passports” to criminals, including Kinahan.
Details from sanctions against Christy Kinahan were found on publicly available corporate documents of a defunct Hong Kong firm (passport number blurred by Bellingcat). Source: US Treasury, Hong Kong Companies Registry
One short-term UAE visa issued for “Christopher O’Brien” ended on August 19, 2015. Posts on LinkedIn three days later showed Christy Kinahan – wearing black-framed glasses and named in the posts as “Christopher O’Brien” – surrounded by Iranian and Turkish businessmen in a high-rise company office in Ankara. These images, discovered by Bellingcat in posts under the name of the managing director of a now-defunct Turkish investment company, have since been deleted.
LinkedIn posts from August 2015 showing “Christopher O’Brien”, a.k.a Christy Kinahan, in an office in Turkey.
According to the Dubai government, employment-based residence visas are valid for two years and must be obtained by a company on its employee’s behalf. The employer is required to apply for a work permit through the UAE’s Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization. The employee must pass a fitness test before their employer can apply for the residence permit.
The company names on Clancy and Kinahan Jr’s residence permits, Al Matn Goods Wholesalers and Island Star Tourism respectively, match existing firms in Dubai. However, Bellingcat was unable to confirm whether these entities are the same as the ones listed on the residence permits. It is also not known why Clancy’s residence permit only includes his first and middle names (“Bernard Patrick”) while the other cartel members’ visas used their full names.
Wanted posters for Irish drugs smugglers Daniel, Christy and Christopher Kinahan Jr, released after the cartel leaders were sanctioned in 2022. Source: US Department of the Treasury
The firm named on Christy Kinahan’s permit, OSA Management Consultancies, is listed as an aviation consultancy on a Dubai government registry. In addition to sharing an address with cartel-linked firm CV Aviation Consulting Services, UAE company data accessed on Horizons, a platform created by Washington DC-based nonprofit C4ADS that aggregates public records, shows that both firms also have the same business licence number and date of incorporation, suggesting OSA may be a newer name for the same entity.
The managing director of Island Star Tourism told Bellingcat on the phone that Christopher Kinahan Jr was working as “commission-based staff, not in-office staff”. He confirmed he recognised Christopher Kinahan Jr’s name but said he had never met him. Asked how the company name appeared on his visa, he said “I don’t know”. He said if the UAE had any problem with Christopher Kinahan Jr, it would “not give permission”.
Al Matn Goods Wholesalers and OSA Management Consultancies did not respond to questions from Bellingcat.
The UAE foreign ministry has been approached for comment.
Connor Plunkett, Peter Barth, Beau Donelly and John Mooney contributed to this article. Scroll-driven interactive by Connor Plunkett and Miguel Ramalho.
Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.
Football fans wagered more than US $14 billion on the FIFA World Cup through prediction markets Polymarket and Kalshi, a Bellingcat analysis has found. On the crypto-based Polymarket, which provides more information about individual trading accounts than its rival American site Kalshi, we also found that just 1% of users collected the vast majority of […]
Cristiano Ronaldo during Portugal’s losing game against Spain earlier this month. Source: Imagn Images via Reuters Connect
Football fans wagered more than US $14 billion on the FIFA World Cup through prediction markets Polymarket and Kalshi, a Bellingcat analysis has found.
On the crypto-based Polymarket, which provides more information about individual trading accounts than its rival American site Kalshi, we also found that just 1% of users collected the vast majority of winnings during the tournament.
Users traded on almost 60,000 outcomes across both sites during the competition, betting on everything from the sponsor of the Golden Boot winner to whether Cristiano Ronaldo would shed a tear during a Portugal match.
The World Cup, held in the US, Canada and Mexico over June and July, was forecast to be the biggest betting event in history, with a predicted $50 billion in wagers.
Unlike traditional sports betting sites, prediction markets resemble stock exchanges where users trade, via an order book, on whether a real-world event will happen. Prices fluctuate based on what the market believes the probability of that event is. The sites charge fees on each sports trade.
With 48 teams playing 104 games, the World Cup was slated to be the biggest gambling event of all time. Source: Polymarket
The prediction market industry has faced criticism over its vulnerability to insider trading, potential market manipulation and concerns about fueling unregulated gambling. The Wall Street Journal also reported in May that a small number of individuals using algorithmic trading models were taking home an outsized share of winnings.
This would appear to align with Bellingcat’s World Cup analysis, where a small percentage of accounts made most of the winnings. However, the level of detail we were able to obtain did not allow us to see accounts that had utilised algorithmic methods.
Both Polymarket and Kalshi make events and volume data available for programmatic extraction – making it useful for open source analysis. Bellingcat’s data analysis examined all 104 matches as well as the World Cup winner event that was hosted on each platform.
On Polymarket, users traded a total of $10 billion ($5.7 billion on individual games and $4.3 billion on which country would win). The largest game on Polymarket was the Spain vs Argentina final ($212 million), followed by the France vs Spain semi-final ($165 million) and the England vs Argentina semi-final ($142 million).
On Kalshi, users traded a total of more than $4.3 billion ($4.1 billion on the games and $200 million on the winner).
Bellingcat’s analysis also found that 1% of Polymarket trading accounts collected 86% of all winnings during the World Cup, and the bottom 50% of winners shared just 0.1% of profits. The typical winning account on Polymarket made $21, while the typical losing account lost $32 (measured by the median, which is less affected by a handful of exceptionally large wins and losses). More than 12% of traders (14,500) who bet on two or more games lost every bet. The Polymarket account that won the most across all games made a profit of more than $13 million, while the biggest loser lost $11.6 million.
We were unable to run the same win-loss analysis for Kalshi because trading account overviews are not publicly available.
The top teams, by trading volume, across both sites were Argentina ($1.068 billion), Spain ($876 million) and France ($836 million). The top players were Argentina’s Lionel Messi ($40 million), France’s Kylian Mbappé ($36 million) and Norway’s Erling Haaland ($16 million).
How We Calculated the Volume
Polymarket displays the actual traded volume on its site, the total US dollar amount of shares bought and sold since the market started.
Kalshi does not display the traded volume. Instead, it shows the notional volume, which counts every contract traded at the maximum payout value of $1. This means that a token bought for $0.20 will be presented as $1 extra in a user’s displayed volume. This makes the total monetary volume appear higher on Kalshi’s website. To achieve a fair comparison between both platforms, we implemented a heuristic to reconstruct Kalshi’s markets’ volume. We used the daily average price for each market over their duration and multiplied it by the number of contracts traded on that day, the sum of which gives us the values used in this piece. We applied this formula for the more than 21,000 World Cup markets.
Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.
Bellingcat has geolocated footage showing Shahed-136 type kamikaze drones in operation in Mali. Defence Blog and France 24 previously published reports that these drones were being deployed on the battlefield in northern Mali. But Bellingcat and Jeune Afrique subsequently verified two recent strikes using geolocation, satellite imagery and expert analysis to provide some of the […]
Bellingcat has geolocated footage showing Shahed-136 type kamikaze drones in operation in Mali.
Defence Blog and France 24 previously published reports that these drones were being deployed on the battlefield in northern Mali. But Bellingcat and Jeune Afrique subsequently verified two recent strikes using geolocation, satellite imagery and expert analysis to provide some of the clearest open-source evidence to date documenting their deployment.
The two strikes took place in the villages of Inafarak on July 12 and Talahandak on July 17. While the available evidence does not allow the exact variant to be identified, experts told Bellingcat it is quite likely the drones were manufactured in Russia given the deployment of the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps group and the broader pattern of Russian military support to Mali.
Leo Jarry, a drone expert with Tungsten Strategies, told Bellingcat: “If the drones are Russian manufactured, they represent a visible demonstration of Russian support for Mali.”
Reports that Russian drones had been used in Mali first emerged in May, when Defence Blog published photographs of drone wreckage from strikes near the town of Savare.
Earlier this month, France 24 also identified debris from several Russian drone systems in Mali, pointing to an expanding Russian drone presence in the country. Until now, however, there has been no verified footage showing how Shahed-136 type drones in flight and hitting targets.
Mali has been mired in conflict since a rebellion erupted in the country’s north in 2012. In recent years, Russian forces, first through the Wagner Group and now through its successor, Africa Corps, have supported the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) in operations against Tuareg rebel groups and jihadist organisations
Inafarak – July 12, 2026
On July 12, footage showing the aftermath of a drone strike in the village of Inafarak was published on X.
Bellingcat geolocated the footage to the town, which is close to the border with Algeria (21.32330, 0.72980) using satellite imagery. We confirmed the location by comparing a post-strike satellite image captured on July 15 with imagery from 2024. The comparison shows several buildings that were standing in 2024 had been destroyed by July, 15, 2026. This damage was consistent with that visible in the geolocated footage. The strike appears to have hit a commercial facility, with a damaged truck and numerous damaged fuel drums visible.
A geolocation diagram showing satellite imagery (top) and a screen grab from footage (bottom) that allowed us to match the site of the strike to Inafark. Satellite Image credit: Planet Labs PBC. Social footage from @EypeMohamedn.
One of the videos shows the remains of an engine which appears consistent with an MD-550, a distinctive four-cylinder two-stroke engine which is found on the Shahed-136 family of drones. We showed the image of the engine to two weapons researchers – Trevor Ball, an independent weapons expert and former Bellingcat investigator, and Leo Jarry, a drone expert with Tungsten Strategies – who said the engine is consistent with the Shahed-136 family of drones.
The component also closely matches reference imagery of MD-550 engines published by the Open Source Munitions Portal (OSMP), an expert-reviewed database of documented weapons remnants, and on the war & sanctions component database.
Left: Screengrab showing the MADO MD-550 engine found in Inafarak. Source: X/@EypeMohamedn. Right: Verified comparison image showing a MADO MD-550 engine. Source: OSMP.
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The footage we found on X was also republished by the Wagner- and Africa Corps-affiliated Telegram channel “White Uncles in Africa”, which regularly shares racist memes and graphic posts and which Bellingcat has previously reported on.
The channel captioned the videos: “Now the Azawadi ‘khokhols’ will be seeing Gerans all the time.” The use of “Geran” refers to a Russian-manufactured version of the Shahed-136. The post also uses the derogatory Russian slur “khokhol” for Ukrainians and applies it to people from Azawad, the name used by Tuareg separatists for northern Mali.
Talahandak – July 17, 2026
On July 17, graphic footage showing the aftermath of another Shahed-136 type drone strike was posted on X, showing one casualty as well as a burning truck. An additional video of the burning vehicle shows what appear to be bottles of cooking oil spilling from the truck indicating it may have been a commercial truck.
Bellingcat geolocated these videos to the village of Talahandak (20.26369, 1.80095), which is also close to the border with Algeria but around 100 miles southeast of Inafarak, by matching the surrounding buildings to satellite imagery.
A geolocation diagram showing satellite imagery (top) and a screen grab from footage (bottom) that allowed us to match the site of the strike to Talahandak. Satellite Image credit: Planet Labs PBC. Social footage from X/@mahmoud_sahara.
Shortly afterwards, a Wagner-affiliated X account claimed that the drone responsible for the strike had been shot down by rebels before hitting the truck. The post showed one video where a Shahed-type drone could be seen in flight.
We were able to geolocate where the footage that captured the drone’s final moments before impact was filmed to another area of Talahandak, nearly a kilometer away (20.266907, 1.792656) from the video that showed the impact site.
Geolocation diagram showing satellite imagery (right) and footage (right) showing Shahed-136 type drone in flight, using high-resolution Planet satellite image from July 23, 2026.
A distinctive smoke plume can be seen rising from the sight of impact in several other videos posted online shortly after the strike.
Bellingcat geolocated each of these videos and matched the plume of smoke adding further confirmation that the footage showing the drone in flight is authentic.
The video shows the drone descending directly towards the location where the person and truck were hit, and there appears to be no interception before impact.
The Shahed-136 is a series of long-range one-way attack drones originally developed in Iran and now also manufactured in Russia. Unlike the drones typically used by Mali’s Armed Forces- the Bayraktar TB2 , which launch relatively small precision-guided munitions before returning to base, one-way attack drones are designed to explode on impact, allowing them to attack over longer distances given they do not require recovery.
Leo Jarry, a drone expert with Tungsten Strategies, told Bellingcat that the drone provides Africa Corps and FAMa with an “expendable, cost-effective” long-range strike capability, allowing them to engage targets in Mali’s far north beyond the effective reach of the Bayraktar TB2. “The fact that these systems are relatively cheap and expendable changes the risk calculation for operators,” Jarry said. “They can be used more freely, potentially forcing insurgents in northern Mali to adapt their behaviour to a new aerial threat.”
However, Jarry said the system is inherently less precise than the Bayraktar TB2 because it cannot verify its targets during flight. Instead, it relies on separate surveillance assets to identify and track targets before launch. “In Mali, where armed groups are highly mobile and frequently operate among civilian populations, any gap between target identification and impact creates a risk of striking the wrong target.” Combined with the drone’s larger warhead, this increases the potential for civilian harm when employed in or near populated areas.
From Ukraine to Sahel
In Ukraine, Russian forces have used Shahed-136 type drones extensively in long-range strike campaigns that have repeatedly targeted civilian infrastructure, causing civilian casualties. Their appearance in Mali raises the possibility that the operational practices associated with these weapons are also being exported to this conflict.
Malian forces and Africa Corps currently face mounting pressure in northern Mali following a series of rebel offensives. Fighting has intensified in recent months, with rebels capturing several military bases and reportedly inflicting heavy losses on both FAMa and Africa Corps.
Jarry told Bellingcat that the relatively low cost and expendable nature of these new drones make them well suited to retaliatory strikes following attacks by rebels.
Bellingcat’s Carlos Gonzales contributed to this report as well as the following members of Bellingcat’s volunteer community: Nicole Kiess, Afton Briones, Riccardo Giannardi and Ziyu Wan.
Bellingcat is a non-profit and the ability to carry out our work is dependent on the kind support of individual donors. If you would like to support our work, you can do so here. You can also subscribe to our Patreon channel here. Subscribe to our Newsletter and follow us on Bluesky here, Instagram here, Reddit here and YouTube here.
